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This project focuses on the philosophy of Yakov Druskin and its applicability as a lens 
through which to examine the metaphysical and religious elements of chinari literature. Formed 
in Leningrad at the dawn of the Soviet Union, the group of authors and philosophers known as 
the chinari has long been recognized as an important component of the Russian avant-garde. 
However, the role of religion and spirituality in their works remains under-examined, despite the 
fact that the group featured a prolific religious philosopher, Yakov Druskin. By exploring a 
selection of Druskin’s philosophical concepts and applying them to major chinari texts—Daniil 
Kharms’ “The Old Woman” and Alexander Vvedensky’s “God May be All Around”—I argue 
that Druskin helps us look beyond the grotesque and comic aspects of the group to uncover 
deeper themes of faith, selfhood, and transcendence. The project adds to our understanding of the 
chinari and works to fill a gap in Slavic studies, as Druskin has received very little scholarly 
attention in the field. This research also points to new directions for further study, prompting us 
to examine more closely the influence of theology and European existentialism on the Soviet 
literature of the absurd.  
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A Note on Translation and Transliteration 
 
 Throughout this work, I have used the simplified ALA-LC transliteration system. Where 
relevant, names have been transliterated as they most commonly are in translated works, even 
when that transliteration deviates somewhat from the transliteration rules. For example, I use 
Alexander Vvedensky rather than Aleksandr Vvedenskii, Yakov Druskin rather than Iakov 
Druskin, and so forth. These transliterations come from the most recent major translators of 
chinari works, Eugene Ostashevsky and Matvei Yankelevich.1 
 Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations of works cited in Russian are mine.  
  
 
1 Eugene Ostashevsky, ed. OBERIU: An Anthology of Russian Absurdism (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
2006). 
Alexander Vvedensky, An Invitation for me to Think, ed. and trans. Eugene Ostashevsky and Matvei Yankelevich 






In 2018, during my second year at Oberlin College, I was introduced to the chinari—a 
literary and artistic collective formed in Leningrad at the dawn of the Soviet Union and the dusk 
of Russian modernism.2 The two most well-known authors from the group, Daniil Kharms 
(1905-1942) and Alexander Ivanovich Vvedensky (1904-1941), produced plays, poetry, and 
prose which reveled in nonsense, grotesque humor, and literary distortions. For a brief period 
from 1927 to 1931, the group existed as a formal collective called “OBERIU,” or “The 
Association for Real Art.”3 Even after this formal group’s dissolution, the authors continued to 
write to and with each other as chinari. For their gleeful rejection of order and 
comprehensibility, their style has been termed “Russian absurdism.” As I read more of and about 
the chinari, I quickly learned what scholars in the West have been discovering since Kharms and 
Vvedensky first appeared in English in 19714—that the chinari have a literary depth far beyond 
the grotesque slapstick one first encounters in their works. As I studied further, the most 
enduring question I faced was that of religion. Kharms and Vvedensky mention God frequently, 
and there are moments in their work when these references seem disarmingly sincere. However, 
the opacity of their writings made it almost impossible to understand exactly what they thought 
of Him or how religion and spirituality function in their artistic world. I became convinced that 
there was some metaphysical, spiritual significance to the chinari project, but what was it? It was 
in pursuit of an answer to this question that I came across Yakov Druskin. 
 
2 The name chinari comes from the word chin, meaning “rank” as in Peter the Great’s table of ranks, used for 
centuries in the Russian Empire to stratify the levels of government service. One member of the group is a chinar, 
and the plural form is chinari. 
3 Ob”edinenie real’nogo iskusstva  
4 See George Gibian, ed., trans, Russia’s Lost Literature of the Absurd: Selected Works of Daniil Kharms and 




 Yakov Semenovich Druskin’s (1902-1980) connection to the chinari goes all the way 
back to his childhood, when he studied as a schoolchild in St. Petersburg (then Petrograd) 
alongside Vvedensky and another future chinar, Leonid Savelevich Lipavsky (1904-1941). 
Druskin remained close with the group throughout their lives and was a core member of their 
intellectual circle. Unlike the other chinari, Druskin methodically avoided the limelight. He 
didn’t publish anything until late in his life, and shunned both artistic and academic renown 
despite having advanced training as a mathematician, philosopher, and pianist. Rather, Druskin 
worked as a schoolteacher, writing prolifically in private.5  
 In most studies of the chinari, Druskin is primarily remembered not for his work, but for 
outliving his friends and saving their manuscripts. By 1942, Kharms, Vvedensky, Lipavsky, and 
Oleinikov had all suffered tragic and early deaths,6 leaving Druskin, rather suddenly, as the last 
chinar. In the midst of the siege of Leningrad, Druskin saved a suitcase full of chinari 
manuscripts from Kharms’ apartment, saving the group from historical extinction. Druskin wrote 
often about his friends and their work, and in the last decade of his life he produced some of the 
first scholarly analyses and histories of the group and their poetics.  
In his own right, Druskin is a fascinating and eclectic thinker. He wrote on a wide range 
of subjects from metaphysics to literary analysis to musicology both during and after the 
lifetimes of the other chinari, and God remains a central theme throughout his oeuvre. His works 
combine the convoluted style of the chinari with the metaphysical weight of existentialist 
 
5 A. L. Dmitrenko and V. N. Sazhin, “Kratkaya istoriya ‘chinarei’” in “...Sborishche druzei, ostavlennykh 
sud’boiu:” “Chinari” v tekstakh, dokumentakh, i issledovaniiakh v 2 tomakh, vol. 1, Ed. V. N. Sazhin, (Moscow: 
Ladomir, 1998), 6. Throughout the rest of this thesis, this anthology will be cited as simply “Sborishche Druzei,” 
following whichever particular author and essay is being cited. 
6 Kharms and Vvedensky were both arrested in 1941 for political crimes and died within months of each other: 
Vvedensky in December 1941 on a prison train from Kharkov to Kazan, Kharms in February 1942, in a prison 




philosophy, a deep-seeded spirituality, and the intimacy of a man writing—especially after 
1942—to and for himself. Unfortunately, relatively little attention has been paid to Druskin’s 
work itself, or its implications for our understanding of the chinari project more broadly. 
 Of course, there are some scholars who have dedicated serious energy to Druskin’s work, 
and they bear mentioning here. Both Neil Carrick7 and Neil Cornwell8 mention the possibility of 
Druskin’s philosophical work as a meaningful influence on Daniil Kharms, but neither pursue 
this idea in depth. A number of Russian scholars—including Andrei Avdeenkov, Aleksei 
Slobozhanin, and Kirill Drozdov, among others—have taken Druskin on his own terms, 
recognizing his efforts to find and create deeper meaning within the chinari project and the 
potential connections between Druskin and the broader category of existentialism.9 Druskin’s 
writings on Johann Sebastian Bach—which will be discussed here further in chapters one and 
three—have drawn the attention of some in the musicological community, including Marina 
Lupishko. Lupishko’s paper on Druskin and Bach was of great use in researching this thesis and 
represents, in my opinion, one of the finest English-language resources on Druskin available.10 
Finally, in his fantastic book, Daniil Kharms and the End of the Russian Avant-Garde, Jean-
Philippe Jaccard comes closest of all to my intentions with this thesis, connecting Druskin and 
Kharms on a conceptual level and using Druskin’s philosophy to elucidate Kharms’ work.11 
 
7 Neil Carrick, Daniil Kharms, Theologian of the Absurd (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Central Printing 
Services, 1998), 71. 
8 Neil Cornwell, “Introduction: Daniil Kharms, Black Miniaturist,” in Daniil Kharms and the Poetics of the Absurd: 
Essays and Materials, ed. Neil Cornwell (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 3-22. 
9 Andrei Nikolaevich Avdeenkov, “’Nekotoroe ravnovesie s nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu:’ ekzistentsial’naia filosofiia 
Ia. S. Druskina,” Vestnik Permskogo Universiteta 23, no. 3 (2015): 65-74. 
Kirill Valer’evich Drozdov, “Lipavskii i Druskin: Chinari v poiskakh smysla,” Vestnik RGGU, Seriia: 
Literaturovedenie. Iazykoznanie. Kul’turologiia, No. 10 (2007): 141-153. 
Aleksei Viacheslavovich Slobozhanin “Gnoseologicheskie problemy v ekzistentsial'noi filosofii Ya.S. Druskina” 
Gumanitarnye vedomosti TGPU im. L.N. Tolstogo, no. 4, (2015): 41-49. 
10 Marina Lupishko, “In Search of Hieroglyphs: Iakov Druskin’s Back ‘Lexicon’ in the Aesthetic Context of the 
Russian and Soviet Avant-garde,” The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (2019): 629-675. 
11 Jean-Philippe Jaccard, Daniil Kharms i konets russkogo avangarda, trans. F. A. Perovskaya (St. Petersburg, 




Jaccard’s work in this area is discussed further in chapter two. 
 In the present project I hope to build upon the work of these scholars, further exploring 
the power of Druskin to help us understand and interpret the chinari project. The thesis is 
divided into three chapters: the first outlines some key elements of Druskin’s thought, while the 
second two chapters apply these Druskinian concepts to the work of Kharms and Vvedensky 
respectively. In the first chapter, I choose to incorporate works from across Druskin’s life, 
including those written long after the death of Kharms and Vvedensky. This reflects my belief 
that it is not only Druskin’s direct influence on his friends during their lifetime which holds 
value. I suggest that we should also see value in using Druskin’s thought—in all its stages of 
development—as a lens through which to read the metaphysical and spiritual aspects of the 
chinari. In the second two chapters, I choose depth over breadth, focusing on just one piece by 
each of the two authors. Across the work, I argue that Druskin’s philosophy helps us connect 
absurdity and divinity in new ways, revealing a chinari metaphysics concerned not only with 






Chapter 1: Yakov Druskin and The Divine Absurd 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter aims to construct a brief overview of some key elements in Druskin’s 
philosophical thought, which will be further developed and connected to individual chinari 
works in the following chapters. Druskin’s long and prolific life leaves the modern student with a 
vast, relatively unstructured body of work, which cannot be comprehensively reviewed in the 
space available here. As such, I have had to be selective in which concepts I choose to cover, and 
which of Druskin’s work I choose to cite. The chapter is not chronological, nor is it 
comprehensive. Rather, the chapter has been broken into three sections, each corresponding to 
Druskin’s treatment of themes which are also highly visible in Kharms and Vvedensky. First, we 
dive into Druskin’s writings on faith itself, to glean more about what he actually thought about 
faith, beyond the mere fact that he was religious. In doing so, we set the stage for fruitful 
interpretations of the myriad mentions of God in other chinari works. Second, the chapter 
reviews Druskin’s thinking on selfhood and free will. This is not only an area of common 
interest between Druskin and his peers, but it is where Druskin makes some of his most unique 
contributions to existential philosophy writ large. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief overview 
of Druskin’s views on time, specifically as they relate to transcendence and divinity. Throughout 
the chapter, I attempt to show that these themes are united by the overarching idea that in order 
to return to God, humans must transcend all facets of rationality, which are ultimately only 
barriers between us and divine absurdity.  
 Throughout this chapter, and throughout the work as a whole, I describe things as 




what exactly constitutes absurdism in literature is beyond the scope of this project, it is worth 
giving some explanation of that to which I am referring. I see two meanings of “absurdity” 
within the texts analyzed in this project. The first pertains to events which are utterly nonsensical 
or illogical and contrary to sense or reason, often to a laughable, comic extent. While we will 
certainly encounter and contend with this absurdity throughout this and the following chapters, 
we must also understand absurdity from a more philosophical perspective. Existentially, the 
absurd carries significance beyond humor and sense-destructing play. Ultimately, the whole 
realm of things which lay outside of human understanding—as above, “utterly nonsensical or 
illogical” —qualifies as absurd. Anything is absurd that is contrary to “normal” human 
understanding, or, even more simply, beyond humanity. In this light, we can describe the 
mystery of God, too, as absurd. Absurdity is mysterious, pervasive, and—as we will see—
intertwined with divinity. 
 
Faith and the Divine 
The Basis of Faith 
Throughout Druskin’s literary career, across disciplines and decades, God, faith, and the 
concept of divinity play a central role. While God and spirituality are too intertwined and 
fundamental to Druskin’s thinking to be fully understood in isolation from his other works, direct 
treatment of the topic is essential for any understanding of Druskin and his influence on the other 
chinari. That Yakov Druskin’s thought would be so intensely centered around Christian theology 
was never a given. Druskin, like Kharms and other chinari, was Jewish, although not brought up 
in strict practice of the faith. Druskin came to faith as an adult, through the music of Bach, after a 




spiritual awakening.12 This awakening seems to have propelled Druskin’s writing—his first 
diaries date back to that same year, 1928. Thus, we can come to two preliminary conclusions 
which we ought to keep in mind while reading and thinking about Druskin. First, the origins of 
Druskin’s faith lie in the creative arts, particularly music. Second, faith is more than just a theme 
in his writing. Rather, it is one of the key motivating factors that drove him to write in the first 
place. This is especially relevant, given the lack of monetary or professional incentive for 
Druskin to write or publish anything officially.13 
Druskin’s religiosity, along with his philosophy as a whole, is deeply personal—he often 
states that his judgements “are applicable only to himself.”14 Although it takes an unmistakably 
Christian form, his religious thinking is much more concerned with a mystical—and, as I argue, 
absurdist—type of personal faith than with ethical debates, normative teachings, or any 
association with organized religion and church institutions. This lack of institutional affiliation is 
due, in part, to the political climate in which Druskin lived. To be a Christian philosopher in the 
early Soviet Union was, after all, no simple task. However, this position was not purely one of 
forced circumstance, but of conscious choice. In his diaries, Druskin claims that his decision to 
forego formal baptism came from a fear of losing the “purity” of his faith.15 Here already we are 
faced with a contradiction: if Druskin considers baptism, which would normally be considered 
the ultimate confirmation of faith, to be a potentially dangerous distraction from faith’s purity, 
what exactly does faith mean to him?  
 
 
12 Lupishko, “In Search of Hieroglyphs,” 630. 
13 Avdeenkov, “Nekotoroe revnovesie s nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu,” 73. 
14 Mikhail Epstein, “Yakov Druskin, 1902-1980” in Filosofia, An Encyclopedia of Russian Thought, 2018, 
http://filosofia.dickinson.edu/encyclopedia/druskin-yakov/. 





The Nature of Faith 
Perhaps the most fascinating and revelatory insights into Druskin’s actual, procedural 
understanding of faith comes to us from the aptly titled essay “On Faith” (O vere).16 Right away, 
Druskin makes clear his position that God cannot be comprehended logically, and that we must 
reach for something far beyond human reason in order to find faith. He writes,  
God is not in knowledge and certainty, but rather in ignorance, uncertainty, and faith. 
Kierkegaard: Paganism is belief in the believable. Christianity is belief in the 
unbelievable… nothing justifies faith. Faith itself justifies. But even this can turn into 
temptation: Only God justifies.17 
 
This insistence on the incomprehensible nature of God and faith is at the core of Druskin’s belief 
system, which, in turn, is at the core of his other thought. To believe is, itself, an absurd act. 
Moreover, any move to rationalize or justify faith renders faith itself impossible. Here, it is 
worthwhile to briefly note the influence on Druskin of the Danish philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard. Druskin references Kierkegaard a number of times throughout his works and 
diaries, and there is definite room for parallels to be drawn between Druskin and Kierkegaard in 
terms of faith and its connection with the absurd or transrational. While a full exploration of 
Druskin and his connection to Kierkegaard and European existentialism is promising, it is far 
beyond the scope of this study. For now, the most important thing Druskin’s reference to 
Kierkegaard tells us is that his thoughts did not develop in a vacuum, and that he had at least 
some access to such philosophy.  
Towards the end of “On Faith,” Druskin goes on to describe the process of attaining all-
consuming faith as “opening your eyes”—a process which is at once extremely easy, since the 
 
16 The exact date of this essay is unknown, but it appears in conjunction with another essay, “On Will” (o vole), 
which dates from 1956. The style and content of “On Faith” support the hypothesis that it was written around that 
same time. 




only thing stopping one from doing it is one’s self, and extremely difficult, since to 
independently overcome the self is impossible. Druskin dwells in this contradiction, describing 
how impossible this task is, and yet how it may be done anyway through God. When Druskin 
does “open [his] eyes,” he finds himself in blissful harmony with both the physical and 
metaphysical worlds.18 For Druskin, it is not only God that cannot be understood directly through 
human calculation, but faith as well:  
It is hard to say what faith is… once, in times of temptation and despair (iskusheniia i 
unyniia), I wrote: ‘strictly speaking, I cannot say that I believe. I don’t disbelieve.’ By 
intuitive logic it follows, then, that I believe… If there is not indifference or bitterness 
towards faith, then ‘I don’t disbelieve,’ but if there exists an endless interest in God, then 
this is already the desire for faith; that is, faith.19 
 
It seems here that all things divine and metaphysical are at once vitally important and impossible 
to define, existing as moving targets, impossible to pin down. Druskin implies that the only thing 
really necessary for belief is the desire to believe. This position is important to keep in mind, as 
it is reflected in Kharms’ “The Old Woman.”  
 In a short tract from 1930 titled “On a nonbelieving person” (o neveruiushchem 
cheloveke), a younger Druskin develops similar lines of thought on the nature of faith to those 
we have seen in “On Faith.” Druskin claims that he “must write a study on a nonbelieving 
person. But a nonbelieving person does not exist. Thus, I wanted to write a study of a person 
who became a nonbeliever.” Druskin describes four different hypothetical people, each with their 
own reason for becoming nonbelievers. The first becomes a nonbeliever “by relying on his own 
mind,” the second because “his feelings were divided.” Druskin describes his third person as an 
“unlucky creation of God'' who is crushed and becomes a nonbeliever because he is left with “no 
 
18 Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, 92. 




opinions or judgement.” Finally, the fourth person becomes a nonbeliever through his love of 
“decorations” (ukrasheniia). Each person proclaims, “there is no God,” and promptly ceases to 
exist. Druskin then turns on himself, claiming that he has made a mistake: the second person, he 
claims, didn’t actually become a nonbeliever, because he still had “feeling” (chuvstvo). The 
fourth person also didn’t stop believing, he just “had good taste,” and the third still had desire, 
which, as we have already discovered, is synonymous with faith for Druskin. Only the first 
person, who came to nonbelief through his own mind and reason, can really be called a 
nonbeliever. Druskin concludes that the mind is the only reason for nonbelief, and that while the 
human mind can seem at first like a gift, like something that gives, it turns out to be an ultimately 
self-destructive force that gives nothing.20  
 The mind, as it stands for reason and rationality, is a dangerous and destructive object for 
Druskin. It is a cage, a barrier, and in fact the only thing standing between us and faith. In light 
of this understanding, absurdity as the path to faith makes perfect sense. If rational sense is the 
only thing standing in our way, it must be transcended. This act of transcendence, by its very 
definition, flies in the face of all that is rational; all that our mind can comprehend. To have faith, 
then, is a fundamentally absurd act. 
 
Revelation: a certain equilibrium with a small error 
 While faith and God will feature heavily beyond this section, there is one more important 
aspect of Druskin’s religious thinking to cover here: the moment of revelation. For Druskin, 
divine revelation takes place in the moment at the intersection of opposing concepts, or in the 
small error that destabilizes an otherwise unified system. Here, we turn to one of our key 
 




Druskinian concepts, “a certain equilibrium with a small error” (nekotoroe ravnovesie s 
nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu). The concept, as a motif appearing throughout Druskin’s oeuvre, is 
difficult to pin down. The idea appears in Druskin’s diaries as early as 1933, in the context of 
finding one’s place in space and time. In the relevant passage, he writes, 
In the certain equilibrium of the order of events which pertain to me, there is also a small 
error. When I drop a habit, for example, there is a duration of time for which I feel a large 
deficiency. But since a new equilibrium, not deferring from the first, is eventually 
reestablished, it follows to think of this gap as a small error.21 
 
 Fleeting as the mention of equilibrium and error may have been in 1933, the idea stuck with 
Druskin, and he returned to it with more attention later in his life. By the 1960s, Druskin seems 
to have realized a much deeper significance to the concept, prompting him to write, in 1966, 
…I found a certain error in the order of events which pertain to me. This error is the 
beginning of all philosophizing, the catalyst of all of human action and life. It is this 
error, and not ambition, which drives creativity: the desire to define one’s place in life… 
not empirically, but transcendentally.22 
 
This connection between the “small error” as a feature of time as experienced by humans with its 
greater importance for human life and creativity allows for the concept’s meaning and 
applicability to expand. In art, as in life, equilibrium may be boring in its perfection, leading to 
stagnation. It is only in a moment of imperfection that we are driven to be more conscious, more 
thoughtful; more active and creative. Here we already see something sacred about the small 
error. The small rift in the fabric of ordered equilibrium, in effect, opens the door to 
transcendence. 
 The implications of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” on creativity and the arts is 
not merely abstract for Druskin. In his musicological book, On Rhetorical Principles in the 
 
21 Druskin, Dnevniki, 52. 




Music of J. S. Bach, Druskin brings the concept to bear on Bach’s music. 
In Bach there is rarely full symmetry in the construction of themes, even under zero 
amplitude. More often, he deviates from it. This, too, is a certain allegory. Perfect 
equilibrium is maintained, despite the small error in it. Not only in Bach’s themes, but in 
his work as a whole … One feels an allegorical equilibrium in the structure of the  
whole—a certain equilibrium with a small error.23 
 
A small error within equilibrium—that is the spiritual revelation Druskin found in Bach. For 
Druskin, the “small error” is sacred. Not only is it, as Jean-Phillipe Jaccard writes, that which 
“makes the world exist, or better that which makes it real for us,”24 but it is that which allows us 
to access the equilibrium in the first place. “A certain equilibrium” is divine, and thus 
inaccessible, impossible to understand in its pure form via human reason. However, in the 
moment of its violation—in the form of a small error—humans can gain knowledge of that 
certain equilibrium. That is, humans can achieve revelation. At the highest level, we can step 
back and imagine God’s spirit as the ultimate ravnovesie: perfect, divine, and incomprehensible. 
In order to reveal himself to the masses, God had to send His son, who is fundamentally removed 
from the Holy Spirit, made imperfect through his mortality. In Jesus, God created a dent, a crease 
in the flat plane of His divinity—that is, a small error. With this in mind, the revelatory power of 
a “small error” can be traced back to the fact that the term is an allusion to Jesus Christ himself. 
Thus, Bach’s subtle violations of his own order are not just beautiful, but divine, recreating in 
miniature the process of divine revelation through Jesus Christ.25  
 
23 Yakov Semenovich Druskin, O ritoricheskikh priemakh v muzyke I. S. Bakha (St. Petersburg, Severnyi Olen’ 
1995), 125. 
24 Jaccard, 142. 
25 Interestingly, Kharms takes up a similar idea in his expansions on another Druskinian concept, “this and that” (eto 
i to). Kharms posits that in between “this” and “that,” there exists a third thing, which he calls an “obstacle” 
(prepiatstvie). Kharms goes on to draw this graphically, showing a horizontal line labeled “this” on the left and 
“that” on the right, intersected by a vertical line П representing the “obstacle.” He then shows how this diagram 
transposes into a cross, implying that this dynamic carries the same symbolic weight as the cross, which for Kharms 




Faith requires that we access a divine equilibrium that is, by definition, inaccessible to us. 
That is, it demands the absolute absurd of the human mind, which yearns for reason. It is only 
with the help of a wrinkle in this unvarnished unity—a small error—that we can achieve 
revelation. Druskin finds this revelatory quality—a certain equilibrium with a small error— in 
literature as well as in music. As chapter three shows, further exploration of this concept is 




Selfhood and Free Will 
 In Druskin’s exploration of religion, as we have seen, he quickly turns to faith and the 
means of achieving it. As such, it follows naturally that his interest in the relationship between 
the self and God should lead to an interest in the nature of selfhood. In a broad sense, almost all 
of Druskin’s work has some relation to “the self,” as he mostly writes in the first person. In the 
absence of a publisher—and without an audience after the death of the other chinari—his work 
is also directed largely at the self, written often in a private, almost intimate register. As such, 
there are many interpretations one could make, and many aspects of “selfhood” that could be 
fruitfully examined. However, for our purposes, the most important writings on selfhood and free 
will come from the book, The Vision of Blindness (Videnie nevideniia) (1995),26 as well as from 
the essay “You and I: Noumenal relationship” (Ia i ty, noumenal’noe otnoshenie) (1964). In 
these pieces, Druskin distills and systematizes ideas which appear as themes throughout his 
 
26 Both The Vision of Blindness and On Rhetorical Principles in the Music of J. S. Bach were published in 1995, 




earlier work as well as in the works of the other chinari, including the fundamental absurdity of 
selfhood, the constraining energy of free will, and the ultimate necessity to renounce the rational 
mind. 
The Absurdity of Selfhood 
In the beginning of The Vision of Blindness, Druskin describes the simple but profound 
phenomenon of catching a glimpse of himself in the mirror and becoming frightened, and it is 
from this feeling of surprised fright that he launches into the rest of the book. From this 
estranging moment of self-perception, Druskin immediately spins out a stream-of-consciousness 
analysis in nine points, identifying a multitude of selves that become real through their 
perception, objectification, and alienation. This attempt at self-knowledge results in a deep 
despair—Druskin writes, 
I ask, ‘who am I?’ and already the answer ‘I am I myself’ is self-objectifying. In my 
reflection and self-objectification, I do not find myself: I stray ever further from myself, 
until I lose myself in the abomination of desolation (merzost’ zapusteniia) in the fires of 
hell.27  
 
Here, we see the central absurdity of selfhood for Druskin: that any attempt at self-location or 
self-perception triggers an infinite feedback loop that accomplishes the exact opposite of its goal, 
serving only to further alienate you from yourself. However, this is only one side of the absurdity 
of selfhood. While it manifests itself in lived experience as a downwards spiral of self-
objectification and alienization, Druskin finds a more theoretical side of the same phenomenon 
through the following train of thought: God creates humans in his image, but He also bestows 
them with limited knowledge and powers. In doing so, according to Druskin, He bestows upon 
humankind an “endless responsibility.” This “responsibility,” as Druskin describes it, is to “open 
 




my eyes …  and become blessed, as He is blessed.” Here, Druskin’s imagery of “opening the 
eyes” reminds us that this is the same revelation described in the previously discussed essay, “On 
Faith: “Then my eyes open, and in every stone, in every tree stump, I see the earth and the 
heavens, the whole world, and every hardship and every misery becomes not a hardship and not 
a misery, but a blessing.”28 Moreover, it leads Druskin to what he calls his “existential 
contradiction: I cannot take this endless responsibility upon myself, as it is beyond my strength; I 
can’t not accept this endless responsibility upon myself, as He has already bestowed it upon 
me.”29 Despite being guiltless and perfect in the moment of creation, humans are simultaneously 
unable to carry out their primary responsibility to God, and are instantly rendered guilty, 
imperfect. In fact, Druskin goes so far as to call this inability to comprehend and carry out this 
responsibility his “original sin.”30  
 In this analysis of sin and the self, we have an application of Druskin’s term, “A certain 
equilibrium with a small error.” Here, the “certain unity” is God’s image, in which we are 
created. However, within that harmonious equilibrium, there is a small error: the fundamental sin 
which comes from a human’s inability to comprehend and carry out our responsibility to God.  
Druskin makes this idea explicit in his later essay, “You and I, Noumenal Relationship:” “Only 
[man] is created directly in God’s image and likeness. But in sin, man violates this likeness: he 
becomes a self. ‘Selfness’ separates man from God.”31 Andrei Nikolayevich Avdeenkov reaches 
a similar conclusion: “To understand [the equilibrium of the universe], one must venture beyond 
the bounds of stable equilibrium, introducing into it an element of error, inaccuracy. Humankind 
 
28 Druskin, Vblizi vestnikov, 92. 
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violates natural equilibrium through its existence.”32 That is to say, sin is the only thing 
separating us from God, and all of selfhood—everything we can hope to know and experience 
through our senses and reason—exists within that “small error.” Avdeenkov’s conclusion also 
points us towards the broader allegorical significance of the term outlined earlier: if the human 
condition is necessarily a violation of “natural equilibrium,” Jesus’ humanity makes sense as a 
“small error” within the natural equilibrium of the Holy Spirit. 
 Druskin sees selfhood and godliness as being at odds with each other, yet another 
indication of the absurdity of selfhood. “The contradiction of man is that he himself sets himself 
apart from God, and at the same time he himself must renounce himself in order to return to 
God.”33 The self is not an ideal, but rather a barrier, separating us from the divine. The answer, 
then, is to return to God, to overcome the rational mind, to embrace and embody the absurd. This 
is no simple task, but Druskin nonetheless offers a path forward. In this path to self-
transcendence, Druskin adds an important additional layer: that of free will. 
Free Will as a Prison 
 Singling out free will in Druskin’s work is important not only because he has interesting 
things to say on the subject (although this is very much the case), but also because the issue is 
very relevant to the other authors whose works we will examine. In many of the works of 
Kharms and Vvedensky, free will is convoluted, if not denied altogether. Characters make 
strange choices, things appear to happen for no apparent reason, and the general link between 
choice and consequence is distorted. Here, again, Druskin provides a useful contextual 
underpinning for our understanding of the chinari. 
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 Essentially, Druskin sees “free will” as a deception on two fronts. First, in the fact of free 
choice itself, Druskin sees a negative side: If our lives are subject to our choice at every given 
moment, then we are forced to choose in every moment. Even the lack of choice is, in fact, a 
choice (the choice to do nothing), and in this sense we are imprisoned, rather than being free. We 
are obligated to constantly choose one of an infinite number of possibilities, and are thus limiting 
ourselves, closing doors. As Mikhail Epstein writes in his analysis of Druskin’s philosophy, 
“freedom, in practice, becomes a chain of necessary limitations.”34 Both Epstein and Avdeenkov, 
writing on Druskin’s views on free will, note the comparison here to Jean-Paul Sartre, who 
expresses a similar sentiment in “Existentialism is a Humanism” (1946): “In one sense, choice is 
possible; what is impossible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I must also realize that, if 
I decide not to choose, that still constitutes a choice.”35 This similarity, however, exists only on 
the surface. Although the idea of being “condemned to choose” appears similarly in both 
Druskin and Sartre, we must remember that Sartre and Druskin come from starkly different sides 
of the existential debate. Sartre’s statement comes from the viewpoint of atheistic existentialism. 
He stresses the impact and importance of individual choice, and his ultimate conclusion is closer 
to the cliche “life is what you make it” than anything else. Druskin, on the other hand, is 
operating from a firmly religious standpoint, and his conclusions are rather different. Druskin 
overlaps with Sartre in the method he uses to undermine “freedom” in free choice, but Druskin 
goes further. For Druskin, free will carries actively negative connotations.  
 In order to understand this, we must remember the role that the rational mind plays in 
Druskin’s thinking. As was made clear in the discussion on the nature of faith, the rational mind 
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is the ultimate barrier between us and divinity. From these two foundational beliefs—that 
divinity exists and is worth striving towards, and that the rational mind is the main thing holding 
us back—Druskin’s rejection of free will becomes clear: Free will is the self at work, and the self 
is, in a word, self-interested. It can only act within its limited abilities and cannot transcend itself. 
Druskin describes this as humankind’s “natural attitude” (estestvennaia ustanovka).36 
Humankind, in its natural attitude, has a subversive motive: “Man, by his very nature— 
consciously or unconsciously—strives to replace God with himself, to take His place, make 
himself God.”37 Thus, “free will” is really a prison, another barrier to revelation, another human 
facet which ends up being primarily a limitation; something to overcome.  
 
You and I 
 Having seen selfhood in all of its absurdity, and having exposed the sinister nature of free 
will, what is to be done? Druskin seems to have given the human soul a great deal to 
“transcend.” How can it be done? While the chinari seem generally unconcerned with answers, 
preferring to complicate, contradict, and bewilder, Druskin actually attempts to answer the 
question in “You and I: Noumenal Relationship.” His answer is relatively simple, and 
surprisingly sweet: We need a companion. 
 More precisely, the I needs to be in a “noumenal relationship”38 with a you. For Druskin, 
the vast majority of love, even the strongest sort, is “natural” rather than noumenal.39 Since it 
 
36 For more on this term, which Druskin borrows from Edmund Husserl, see Sebastian Luft, “Husserl’s Notion of 
the Natural Attitude and the Shift to Transcendental Phenomenology,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 80 (2002): 225-
229. 
37 Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, 169. 
38 “Noumenal” here can be taken to mean, roughly, “higher, transcendental, and inaccessible to human reason.” For 
more on the term, see: https://www.britannica.com/topic/noumenon. 
39 As was the case with its connection to Kierkegaard, a full exploration of Druskin’s conception of noumena and 




ultimately relates back to the self, this love and these relationships boil down to egoism. Druskin 
uses a mother and her child as an example: “The love of a mother to her child, especially an 
infant, is natural, tribal egoism…because an infant child is not yet an I, and for the mother is not 
yet a you either, but rather her own natural continuation. However, if the mother sees in her child 
a future you, created in the image and likeness of God, then her love is noumenal, and not just 
natural.” To be noumenal, then, for Druskin, is to be in reference not to the self, but to God. 
Thus, “the relationship between you and I is noumenal if between you and I there stands God.”40  
 This you, the special other with whom you have a noumenal bond, Druskin calls a “co-
responsible assistant” (sootvetstvenniy pomoshchnik).41 When a person achieves this sort of 
relationship, they become able to overcome the abject spiral involved in trying to independently 
locate and understand the self. Through each other and the relationship between them, their 
burden—their endless responsibility—becomes shared, and lightened. Through noumenal 
companionship, we touch God. 
 However, Druskin ends his essay with a caveat: There is a second path to God, without a 
companion. It is also possible, despite its difficulty, to have a noumenal relationship with 
oneself.  
By refusing a sentimental or prideful relationship with myself—that is, by humbling 
myself—I find a new order for my life in the past, I find a kind of unnatural permanence 
within the natural state of change. I truly feel a kind of common leadership in my life, 
despite the vast number of mistakes for which I now so deeply repent… This is the path 
of penance, humility, and prayer.42  
 
If coming to God through a companion involves overcoming the self through effectively melding 
 
40 Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, 171-177. 
41 Druskin claims that God created Eve in order to be this sort of companion for Adam, but that by tasting the 
forbidden fruit she ceased to fulfill her duty. This sets Druskin in line with the long line of men who have warped 
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identities with someone else, this path involves a more intense self-denial which, in turn, gets 
more directly at God.  
 Thus, we have the broad strokes of the self and free will according to Druskin: The 
absurdity of selfhood, free will as a prison, and a path forward through noumenal companionship 
or mystical self-transcendence. However, this is not the end of what we can say about Druskin. 
In “On Faith,” Druskin writes, “God is now—the eternal now.” This cryptic statement points us 
to the final major theme we must cover before we understand the concepts which we are to see in 
Kharms and Vvedensky: Time. 
 
Time and Death 
Even early in his life, Druskin had already identified the core elements of his views on 
time. In a fragment dated to the second half of the 1920s, he lays out a “new theory of time,” 
which, as he claims, had been revealed to him by God. The theory, in its entirety, is as follows: 
“When something was, then it was not, just like that which will be, but it is now. And the 
reverse: when something is now, that which was before was not before, just like that which will 
be later.”43  
 Straight away, we run into the aforementioned interpretative challenge: while Druskin 
was attempting to systematize chinari thought, he was a chinari himself, and utilized many of 
the same stylistic conventions as his friends—that is to say, he often wrote in the most 
convoluted way imaginable. Nonetheless, the thrust of the theory can be clarified: The past, 
present, and future cannot be considered separately from one another. Each has an impact on the 
others, and all three are somehow bound together in a mysterious, overarching unity. 
 




Additionally, the connection between time and God was already firmly established, as was 
Druskin’s insistence on the limits of his own knowledge. He stresses, before delivering the 
“theory,” that he himself didn’t know what he was saying, and that he was only repeating what 
God had given him. Thus, we can already say that much like the self and divinity, time is another 
concept that exists beyond the powers of the rational mind. 
 As the chinari pushed forth into the 1930s, past the end of the OBERIU era, Druskin’s 
father suddenly died. This propelled him into a deep, prolonged personal crisis, and produced a 
beautiful, haunting essay entitled “Death.”44 While, as I have already stated, all of Druskin’s 
writing is strikingly personal, this is especially true of “Death.” In it, Druskin is wrestling 
directly with his father’s passing—the first of many deaths with which he would be forced to 
reckon—and in doing so, he lays out an evolved conception of time that would persevere long 
after the passing of his father. Druskin begins the discussion of time with a starkly pessimistic 
observation: “The whole is not comprehensible within time. Time bears death.” Time, as a 
directional force, has a destination, which for Druskin is death and decay. He sees this as, in fact, 
the only function of time, separating “time” as a directional process from “moments.” He writes: 
One can say what is not in time, but how can one say what time is? Not any of the words 
that apply to things that exist can be applied to time; we may even say that it does not 
exist. But this nonexistent thing is the most frightening of powers and you feel best when 
you don’t feel it. Nor do I understand when they say that something exists in time. 
Something exists in the moment, whereas in time it is destroyed and ceases to exist.45  
 
With the death of his father, Druskin feels the weight of time squarely upon his 
shoulders, and the existential dread that comes with the promise of aging and eventual death. But 
this is not simply Druskin wallowing in his sadness. He means what he says here, and he comes 
 
44 This is one of the very few pieces of Druskin’s to have been published in translation. It appears alongside two 
other short pieces in Eugene Ostashevsky’s anthology, OBERIU: An Anthology of Russian Absurdism, 219-236. 




to important conclusions. First, a conclusion about the moment: “The moment is the only reality. 
Then there are also memory, imagination, and reason. All of them can be united under the name 
of ideas. They are the signs of moments. They put a stop to duration, they divide it. When I find 
the right sign, I name the moment, and motion and duration halt, they cease to exist, they become 
what they are, that is: nothing. For they do not exist in the moment, and nothing exists apart from 
the moment.” Second, a conclusion about God: “If God sees my whole life, he sees it at once, 
that is to say not in time. God does not see time, whereas I experience time as a certain defect ... I 
do apprehend myself, but only in the moment.”46 From these quotes, we see the “moment” as 
both more real and more important than linear time whereas God exists beyond time, in what 
could be described as a never-ending moment, an eternal now.  
This connection between the end of time and transcendence is a theme in the chinari’s 
creative oeuvre. The connection between Druskin and Vvedensky will be discussed in greater 
depth in chapter three, but we can already see how Druskin’s philosophy helps bring meaning to 
the final lines of Vvedensky’s “God May be All Around” (Krugom vozmozhno Bog), which 
initially seem like absurdist nonsense: “In runs a dead man / and silently erases time.”47 If we 
understand time in Druskin’s terms—that is, as a defect, a harbinger of death, a reflection of 
humankind’s limited ability to comprehend the true nature of things—we can then understand 
the erasure or destruction of time as a transcendent act. This adds metaphysical weight to the 
passage and works against the tendency to interpret absurdism as a postmodern process by which 
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 In the course of this chapter, we have seen how Druskin relates the self, free will, and 
linear time to each other as obstacles; agents of the rational mind which must be overcome in 
order to find God. We have seen the metaphysical importance of absurdity for Druskin, as 
overcoming rationality and embracing the absurd is the only way to access the divine. Divinity is 
absurd, and absurdity is divine: the two define each other. In the next chapter, we will see how 
Druskin’s work on faith and free will helps uncover deeper meanings in the prose of Daniil 
Kharms. 
 We have also discovered the role of creative art in the process of revelation. Beyond the 
fact that Druskin’s religious revelation is rooted in the aesthetic experience of Bach’s music, the 
concept of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” helps us see religious allegory in artistic 
asymmetry. While Druskin found this asymmetry in Bach, we know that he saw the same 
significance in the works of the other chinari. In chapter three, “a certain equilibrium with a 
small error” will become an invaluable tool to help us understand how the structure of a work of 
art—not just its content or context—can perform a divine task.  
 Thus, understanding Druskin’s key concepts reveals a new depth of metaphysical 
sincerity and nuance to the greater chinari project, shedding a new light on particular aspects of 





Chapter 2: Searching for Faith in Kharms’ “The Old Woman” 
 
Introduction 
Daniil Ivanovich Kharms, born as Daniil Ivanovich Yuvachev in Saint Petersburg in 1905, has 
become the best-known of the chinari by a wide margin. Scholarship around Kharms is much 
more robust than around any other chinar or around the group in general, but surprisingly little 
attention has been given to the relationship between him and Druskin. One scholar who has 
recognized Druskin’s importance to understanding Kharms is Jean-Philippe Jaccard. In his book, 
Daniil Kharms and the End of the Russian Avant-Garde,48 Jaccard focuses his study primarily on 
Druskin’s writings from the late 1920s and early 1930s—the period of the OBERIU in which he 
had the most “intense relationship”49 with Kharms. Jaccard succeeds in establishing the direct 
influence of Druskin on Kharms, particularly through his exploration of “this and that” (eto i 
to)—a recurring motif in the work of Druskin and Lipavsky seen in their writings as early as the 
1920s—and its connection with Kharms’ 1930 poem “Notnow” (neteper’).50  
In this chapter I have taken a different—and necessarily narrower—approach, 
incorporating some of the later philosophical works discussed in chapter one and using Druskin’s 
thought as a prism through which to view just one of Kharms’ stories, “The Old Woman” 
(Starukha). Written in 1939, “The Old Woman” is among Kharms’ latest, longest, and most 
well-known pieces. The story follows a writer who meets an old woman one day by chance. The 
woman appears in his apartment later on and seems to wield a dominant power over the narrator 
before suddenly dropping dead. The narrator intends to get rid of the body immediately, but ends 
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up meeting his friend, Sakerdon Mikhailovich, and an unnamed woman. He talks with them both 
about God and other existential matters before finally boarding a train bound for Lisy Nos with 
the old woman’s corpse stuffed in a suitcase. On the train, however, the suitcase vanishes. The 
story ends with a fascinating, nebulous final scene: the narrator arrives at Lisy Nos, walks into 
the woods, and says a prayer: “In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, now 
and forever and ever, amen.”51 Unlike many of the short poems and prose fragments from earlier 
works, “The Old Woman” has a definite plot and a comprehensible (although still bizarre) 
structure. It also has a notable philosophical and metaphysical weight. The characters deal 
directly, albeit strangely, with the question of God, making “The Old Woman” an excellent 
example for analysis here. 
 While my analysis of “The Old Woman” is aimed at metaphysical questions and the 
connections between Kharms and Druskin, I must briefly address the socio-political context in 
which the story came to be. As scholars routinely point out, the often-cruel absurdity of Kharms’ 
work can be seen, in part, as a reflection of the era of Stalinist repression through which he lived. 
While I believe that we must be careful not to rely too heavily on this comparison to explain 
away all of Kharms’ artistic intentions, it is certainly important to keep in mind. In fact, I see it 
as especially relevant for this story. By the time it was written, this political system had begun to 
have real consequences for Kharms and people around him. Kharms himself had not yet suffered 
greatly, although he was blacklisted briefly in 1937 after political allegory was found in one of 
his children’s poems. However, some more peripheral members of the literary circle were not so 
lucky. Nikolai Zabolotsky, despite having estranged himself from the chinari in favor of writing 
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government-approved verse, was accused of affiliation with a “group of terrorist writers” and 
sent to a labor camp that same year, 1937. Most brutally, the year before, Nikolai Oleinikov was 
executed after being forced to admit to participation in a Trotskyist plot.52 By late 1938 and early 
1939, social and political issues were coming to a dangerous and chaotic boil, both in broader 
Europe and among the Russian literary avant-garde.53 
 While socio-political interpretations of this text are certainly valuable, my aim here, is 
not to focus on the political context of “The Old Woman,” but to use it as a case study, to 
demonstrate how the philosophical ideas of Yakov Druskin can give rise to new readings and 
interpretations of Kharms’ work. In this chapter, I will present two insights into the “The Old 
Woman,” both of which become possible by reading Kharms through a Druskinian lens. First, I 
will examine the central role time plays within the story, using Druskin’s writings on time to 
propose that anxieties around aging are a central part of the narrator’s struggle. Second, I will 
turn to the question of faith in the story, engaging with two earlier analyses to present a new 
interpretation of the story as a parable of the narrator’s coming to faith, grounded in Druskin’s 
writings on faith and free will.  
 
Time and Aging  
The first insight into “The Old Woman” that Druskin helps uncover is centered around 
time. Time is clearly a major theme in the story, but its significance is hard to tease out. Using 
Druskin’s 1935 essay, “Death” as a lens, I argue that the old woman can be seen to act as a 
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personification of time itself, against which the narrator wrestles as he struggles with aging and 
bodily decay. 
From the very beginning of the story, the narrator is set at odds with time. He approaches 
an old woman holding a clock on the street to ask for the time54 and is surprised when the 
woman’s clock has no hands. Somehow, however, the woman is still able to tell the narrator 
what time it is. This immediate plunge into the situationally absurd can be seen from a formalist 
perspective as a device to destabilize all forms of order in the story, but it lays the metaphysical 
framework for the story as well. If we remember the significance for Druskin of transcending 
linear time, the clock with no hands can be taken as a symbolic hint at the strange, divine nature 
of things to come. Of course, the narrator is bound to the imperfect, human understanding of 
sequential time, and is forced to ask the old woman to tell him the time in the conventional sense. 
Nonetheless, he feels a vague sense of the underlying truth of the handless clock: “I keep 
remembering the old woman with the clock whom I saw today in the yard, and it seems pleasant 
to me that her clock had no hands. Recently in a secondhand shop I saw a repulsive kitchen clock 
on which the hands were made to look like a knife and fork.”55 The contrast between the old 
woman’s handless clock and the kitschy kitchen clock reflects Druskinian conceptions of time. 
Something about the handless clock feels correct, pure, “pleasant,” while the hands of a clock 
can be seen as dissecting tools, cutting a whole into strange chunks that are simultaneously 
artificial as well as completely necessary in order for us to make even an attempt at self-location. 
In addition, this quote helps illustrate the double-sided nature of the chinari absurd: the mundane 
and the metaphysical. The clock from the secondhand shop is comic, tacky, and vulgar. The old 
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woman’s clock, while equally absurd, has a spiritual weight to it that becomes visible through 
the prism of Druskin. 
As the story goes on, the narrator’s relationship with time is strained, impatient, and 
uncomfortable. In multiple instances, he sets out to do something for a certain amount of time 
but ends up spending far too much or too little time on each task. He tries to take a long nap but 
can’t sleep. He wants to write for 18 hours straight but can’t get past a single sentence. When he 
wants something to take a long time, he can’t make it happen. Conversely, when he wants to 
hurry, he wastes time: “Quickly, quickly to work. Away with all dreams and laziness…. It’s only 
five o’clock. I have all day before me, the evening and the whole night… I stand in the middle of 
the room. What am I thinking about? It’s already twenty to six. I’ve got to write.”56 More 
broadly, the narrator runs into a litany of time-based problems throughout the story: The bread 
line is too long, the old woman is decomposing because the narrator took too long to get home, 
the house superintendent won’t be in until the following day—just to name a few examples.  
These temporal obstacles and anxieties pervade “The Old Woman.” But what larger 
theme could they point to? And how can Druskin help us find it? In his 1935 essay, “Death,” 
Druskin spells out the difference between “time” as an ultimately deceptive linear process and 
“moments” as the actual temporal units of reality as perceived by humans. He writes, “Time 
brings death… Nor do I understand when they say that something exists in time. Something 
exists in the moment, whereas in time it is destroyed and ceases to exist.”57 From a divine 
perspective, time is an unbroken whole—a clock with no hands. From the human perspective, 
however, time is the process of approaching death, which we do through a series of moments. 
With this connection between time and death established, we can see in the old woman more 
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than a metaphor for death, or a character with a strong connection to time. Rather, she herself 
becomes a personification of time in the Druskinian sense—that is, a haunting force that brings 
death. If the old woman represents time, other temporal aspects of the story “click” into place, 
and a new central theme of the story emerges: The narrator’s anxieties around growing old.  
 In her brief time spent alive58 in the story, the old woman commands and manhandles the 
narrator easily into submission. Both the woman’s actions and the narrator’s reactions take on 
new significance when we interpret the old woman’s character as a personification of time:  
‘Kneel down,’ says the old woman. I kneel down. But now I begin to feel the full 
absurdity of my position. Why am I kneeling in front of some old woman? Why is this 
old woman in my room, sitting in my favorite chair? Why didn’t I throw the old woman 
out? … Pain in my shoulder and in my right hip bone forces me to change my 
position…All my limbs are numb and don’t bend easily.59 
 
 On one hand, the old woman behaves much like time: She barges in uninvited, directs us 
according to her will, and renders us full of aches and pains. In this scene, it is as if the narrator 
undergoes the entire aging process in miniature, so accelerated that it feels more like acute 
torture. Simultaneously, the narrator’s reaction to his treatment at the hands of the old woman 
coincides with Druskinian notions of time. As we have already established, the narrator’s 
appreciation of the handless clock shows that he already has some inkling, however vague, of the 
true nature of time. Thus, when faced with the demands of the old woman, he is able to 
understand the absurdity of his position despite remaining unable to resist.  
 I see this struggle with time as tied in with the main character’s anxieties around aging. 
The first hint at this comes even before the old woman enters the apartment, when the narrator 
claims that his friend Sakerdon Mikhailovich believes he is “no longer capable of writing a work 
 
58 Although, I suppose, one could argue that she was never really alive, or never really dead, or that she’s 
somewhere in between the two states, rendering both meaningless. 




of genius.”60 From the beginning, then, our narrator is wrestling with the idea that he may be past 
his prime. The same anxiety is reflected in the two interactions he has with the would-be love 
interest, referred to as the “nice lady.” While no age difference between the two is explicitly 
spelled out, an age difference is implied in the way time twice prevents him from being with her. 
In their first encounter, this interference is somewhat indirect: right before bringing her to his 
apartment, he remembers that the old woman is lying dead on his floor. The second encounter is 
even more blatant: While carrying the suitcase containing the woman’s corpse, he sees the nice 
lady but is unable to run quickly enough to catch up to her. He attributes this to the weight of the 
suitcase, which, in our working metaphor, becomes the weight of time—that is, his age. For good 
measure, two young boys even stop to make fun of him after he tries unsuccessfully to chase the 
nice lady down. For our purposes, this can be read as time, in the form of the narrator’s age, 
literally weighing him down and preventing him from any sort of successful social (let alone 
romantic) interaction. The old woman stands between him and the young woman. If the old 
woman represents this bleak version of time, it follows that a central concern of the narrator is 
growing old.  
 This conclusion helps us understand another one of the recurring motifs of “The Old 
Woman”: disease and bodily decline. Perhaps the clearest example here is the group of young 
boys who pop up at the beginning and end of the story. These boys don’t do anything particularly 
out of the ordinary, but their noisy playfulness is enraging to the narrator, who daydreams about 
inflicting them with tetanus. The explanation here is pretty simple: he’s a grumpy old man! This 
is even clearer the second time the young boys appear, since this time they’re laughing directly at 
him after he fails to catch up to the nice lady. This is not a ridicule of bodily decline so much as 
 




it is a reflection of the narrator’s own anxieties. He feels attacked by the boys’ youthful energy, 
and spitefully dreams about their slow and gruesome death. A similar story plays out with 
another recurring minor character, the man with an artificial leg. Here, instead of the narrator 
himself hating the cripple, the narrator observes the ridicule of society. The man with the 
artificial leg makes three appearances in the story. First, he is simply observed by the narrator, 
with no commentary or context, other than the fact that “he is making a loud noise with his leg 
and a stick.”61 The second and third times, the narrator observes the man being pursued and 
laughed at, first by the six young boys, and then by adults.62 While the interactions with the 
young boys reveal the narrator’s spite, his observations of the crippled man underline his fear. 
He sees society laugh at his misfortune and feels the weight of the old woman of time pushing 
him towards that same laughable state of grotesque bodily decay.  
 How, then, in this reading, are we to interpret the mysterious final scenes of “The Old 
Woman,” in which the dead woman disappears and the narrator ventures into the woods to pray? 
In his book, Daniil Kharms, Theologian of the Absurd, Neil Carrick finds a useful starting point 
in considering the old woman’s disappearance as a misinterpreted miracle. He points out that 
earlier in the story, the narrator essentially asks for a miracle, imagining that the old woman has 
magically disappeared from his room. As Carrick writes, “The absence of any miracle soon 
becomes apparent when he discovers the Old Woman is still there. Miracles, the narrator learns, 
are not available on demand, even in extreme circumstances.”63 Thus, when the old woman 
really does miraculously disappear on the train, the narrator mistakenly attributes it to human 
causes rather than to God.  
 
61 Kharms, 163. 
62 Kharms, 177, 184. 




 Keeping this analysis in mind and layering Druskin’s understanding of time on top of it, 
these events take on even deeper significance. The real miracle is not just that God has relieved 
the narrator of the unpleasant task of dealing with a dead body, but that God has lifted from the 
narrator the burden of time itself. As we have seen in our discussions of Druskin, this is a key 
element of transcendence. Humans are trapped in their perception of linear time, while God 
exists in the eternal now. Humans experience time as a “certain defect,” leaving time as another 
obstacle to be transcended in order to access the divine. This is perhaps paralleled by the 
narrator’s physical setting as he moves from the confined, manmade, unidirectional enclosure of 
the train to the vast, still, natural setting of the woods. Thus, the miraculous disappearance of the 
old woman from the train is the closest we can get to a “rational” explanation for why the 
narrator goes into the woods to pray. By removing his temporal anxieties, the narrator is a step 
closer to divinity, to the noumenal world in which time exists as a single moment. The burden of 
time, which a human could never independently escape, has been lifted from his shoulders, 
revealing God. 
 
Faith and Free Will 
The readings of “The Old Woman” that jump out most immediately revolve around the 
story’s plethora of references to—and parodies of—classic works of Russian literature. Framed 
by the landmarks of St. Petersburg (Nevsky and Liteyny Prospekts, Lakhta, and so forth) and 
centered around a young man’s killing of an old woman, the story clearly plays with such 
classics as Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1866), Pushkin’s Queen of Spades (1934), and 
Gogol’s Petersburg Tales (1835-1842).64 Many scholars have pointed to these aspects of parody 
 




and satire in “The Old Woman,”65 and not without reason. The literary connections are effective 
in placing the story in cultural context and highlighting the clever and comic aspects of the work. 
However, the existential aspects of the story are equally important. Some inroads have been 
made in this direction, including studies by Neil Carrick and Alice Stone Nakhimovsky that 
explicitly highlight the text’s religious dimensions. While both Carrick and Nakhimovsky deal 
with religion in the context of “The Old Woman,” neither make use of the potential framework 
provided by Druskin. If we read the story with Druskin’s theories on faith and free will in mind, 
“The Old Woman” becomes almost a parable; a story of the narrator’s struggle to find faith. 
 Interestingly, Nakhimovsky does allude to Druskin briefly in her discussion of “The Old 
Woman.” She writes,  
The line of development that leads to Starukha involves two ideas: a belief in God closely 
integrated with the details of everyday life and the expectation of a miracle. Both of these 
ideas can be found in Kharms's work dating from the early thirties. They are also present 
in the philosophical writings of la. S. Druskin, a close friend of Kharms and, like him, a 
member of Lipavskii’s circle. Druskin's philosophy—in particular, the idea that through 
prayer one can glimpse the transcendent state that lies just beyond the surface of ordinary 
life—seems especially relevant to Starukha.66  
 
Despite noting that it may be relevant to “The Old Woman,” that is the last we hear of Druskin in 
Nakhimovsky’s chapter on the story. Instead, she focuses on the relationship between faith and 
 
65 Ellen B. Chances, “Daniil Charms’ ‘Old Woman’ Climbs her Family Tree: ‘Starucha’ and the Russian Literary 
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The Modern Language Review, 90.3 (1995): 707-721. 
66 Alice Stone Nakhimovsky, Laughter in the Void: An Introduction to the Writings of Daniil Kharms and Aleksandr 




the comic grotesque, asserting that the first arises through the second in Kharms’ story.67 
However, the idea that she hints at in her introduction is correct, and worth further exploration.  
Druskin lays out the idea referenced by Nakhimovsky—that the realm of divinity is 
visible through prayer—across his work, but it features prominently in an essay discussed 
thoroughly in Chapter 1: “You and I, Noumenal Relationship.”68 Although Druskin had not 
written “You and I: Noumenal Relationship” by the time Kharms wrote “The Old Woman,” 
Druskin’s essay provides an interesting structure for the process Kharms’ narrator goes through 
in the story.  
In “You and I,” Druskin is centrally concerned with companionship. He believes that 
relationships between two people can reach a special level of closeness which goes beyond the 
normal range of emotion and allows people to understand each other’s essences on a deeper, 
mystical level. Through this active love, infused with love for God, a relationship can become 
“noumenal.” These noumenal relationships, in turn, become the means through which humans 
can access the divine. When an isolated individual attempts to locate their self or access a state of 
transcendence and divinity, they are inevitably met with failure and despair, crushed by the 
infinite and impossible responsibility to transcend the material realm that God lays upon His 
subjects.69 However, with the help of a true companion (a “co-responsible assistant” in Druskin’s 
terminology), the burden is lightened, and the impossible becomes possible. Thus, a central part 
of the greater search for faith is the search for a noumenal companion. However, the mystical 
 
67 This is already similar to Druskin’s views on faith, as expressed throughout his work. Here, the “comic grotesque” 
can be thought of as one element of the absurdity of everyday life, that is, one particular strain of the absurd. While 
the two are not identical—Nakhimovsky refers to the comic grotesque as a literary device while Druskin refers to 
the absurd as a condition of our real world—the two are closely linked. In order to create the comic grotesque, 
Kharms describes and makes light of the strange, senseless, and cruel events that occur in the world which are 
impossible to understand logically. That is, he describes the absurd.  
68 Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, 178. 




quality of Druskin’s concept makes it difficult to imagine how a real person could actually 
achieve a noumenal relationship, or what form it should take. Druskin stresses that these 
relationships are created “not by free will, but beyond willpower,” and that they, being 
noumenal, exist partially in a world which is necessarily beyond the grasp of the human mind.70 
Thus, we can imagine that the actual process of searching for this sort of relationship could be 
fraught and ultimately unsuccessful. In fact, this concept, as well as its practical shortcomings, 
are played out in Kharms’ “The Old Woman.”  
When the old woman appears, she acts as a harbinger of the absurd, bringing the narrator 
into an acute and painful state of existential awareness, comparable to what the German 
existential philosopher Karl Jaspers refers to as “boundary situation.”71 To put it in the words of 
Kharms’ narrator, he suddenly becomes conscious of “the absurdity of [his] position.”72 This 
heightened state of existential awareness, in turn, prompts the narrator to search for faith. 
 This search for faith is connected to companionship not only by Druskin’s philosophy, 
but by Kharms’ story itself. The search for faith and companionship plays out in “The Old 
Woman” through conversations with both the younger lady and with Sakerdon Mikhailovich. In 
both cases, he asks his interlocutor whether or not they believe in God. While the young lady 
seems taken aback, she agrees that, of course, she does. While she may believe rather passively 
and unthinkingly, the narrator remains interested in her, and tries to pursue her (albeit thwarted 
by the old woman). In their conversation, the lady clearly expects the narrator's question to be an 
invitation to his apartment rather than a questioning of her faith. In fact, the narrator follows up 
his question about faith with the expected invitation, implying that her answer to his first 
 
70 Druskin, Vblizi Vestnikov, 173-174. 
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question may have been a condition, a prerequisite to his invitation. Connecting the discussion 
back to Druskin, it seems that by confirming her belief in God, she has identified herself as a 
potential companion for the narrator, prompting him to remain interested in her.73 Ultimately, she 
is unable to become his companion, as their relationship is consistently thwarted by the looming 
presence of the old woman, time. 
In contrast, the narrator’s conversation with Sakerdon Mikhailovich is less promising. 
When asked about his belief in God, Sakerdon takes offense, refusing to answer and describing 
the question as inappropriate (neprilichnyi). In response, the narrator seemingly retreated, 
backpedaling his question and making an excuse to leave. In other words, Sakerdon has 
demonstrated his unwillingness to be a true and noumenal companion.74 Thus, consciously or 
unconsciously, the narrator tries twice to establish a noumenal relationship and find God through 
a “co-responsible” companion. Both times, we see the narrator wrestling with the vagueness of 
what such a relationship might actually look like — knowing that he needs a companion, but not 
knowing exactly how to look for or create that noumenal bond.  
In this stage of the narrator’s struggle with faith, Kharms touches upon another religious 
idea that will be familiar to the reader from chapter 1: that of the relationship between belief and 
the desire to believe. After Sakerdon refuses to answer the narrator’s question, he states that 
“there are no believing and nonbelieving people, only those who wish to believe and those who 
wish not to believe.” Sakerdon responds, “in that case, those who wish not to believe already 
believe in something …  and those who wish to believe don’t already believe in anything.”75 
This dialogues rests squarely in the shadow of Druskin’s philosophical musings. Through the 
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dialogue of his characters, Kharms plays with ideas discussed by Druskin in both “On Faith” and 
“On a nonbelieving person.” In “On a nonbelieving person,” Druskin describes how, despite 
faith supposedly requiring so much from humans,76 it is actually very difficult to describe or 
locate a person who does not believe in God. This paradoxical situation in which the 
nonbelieving person ceases to exist when placed under examination77 is reflected in Kharms’ 
conversation: By desiring not to believe, the nonbeliever must tacitly admit to the existence of 
that which they hope to deny. In order for this to be true, of course, we must accept as fact that 
the desire to believe or not is the same as actual belief (or lack thereof). This idea mirrors the one 
expressed by Druskin in “On Faith:”  
Strictly speaking, I cannot say: ‘I believe.’ I don’t not believe. By intuitive logic it does 
not necessarily follow that I believe. But is this applicable to faith?  If there is not 
indifference or ill will towards faith, then ‘I don’t not believe,’ but if there is an endless 
fascination with God, then this is already the desire to believe, that is, belief.78  
 
As the conversation continues, it becomes clear that the narrator is struggling with the 
elusive nature of faith. When Sakerdon points out that those who desire not to believe must 
already believe, the narrator responds that it may be so, that he doesn’t know. Annoyed, 
Sakerdon reiterates: “Well, what is it that they do or don’t believe? God?” Again, the narrator 
struggles to pin down exactly what faith can mean. “No,” he says, “In immortality.”79 The 
narrator feels the beginnings of faith, the old woman has prompted him to wrestle with it, and yet 
he remains unable to pin it down semantically, unable to define it. To refer again back to 
Druskin, this is an example of how the divine is absurd—that is, incomprehensible to logic and 
 
76 I. e. the overcoming and transcendence of the mind described in Vision of Blindness, “You and I: Noumenal 
Relationship,” and numerous other works. Or, as Druskin himself writes in “On Faith,” “eto ochen’ trudno i ochen’ 
legko” (it is very difficult and very easy). 
77 Druskin, “O neveruyushchem cheloveke,” in “Sborishche druzei”, 735. 
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When the narrator returns to his apartment, he faces a critical moment. He must attempt 
to re-enter the apartment, and somehow deal with the old woman. Here, he enters into a crisis, 
trying desperately to force himself to rush in and smash the woman’s skull. His fear and 
uncertainty whirl around him, culminating in a vision of the woman crawling towards him on all 
fours before he eventually talks himself down and makes it back into his room. In this scene, I 
see the beginnings of another crucial stage in the process of coming to faith: The struggle with 
free will. From Vision of Blindness and “You and I: Noumenal Relationship,” we know the 
importance of free will as a topic of Druskin’s thought. In the previous chapter, we showed how 
Druskin considers free will both an illusion and a prison, a manifestation of the rational mind’s 
ambition to usurp God, that must be overcome in order to access divinity.  
Standing outside his apartment door, the narrator is set at odds with his thoughts. He 
freezes in the hallway, and despite telling himself over and over, “I can’t stand here like this,” he 
remains rooted to the spot, unable to move. In the immediate moment, he is powerless, unable to 
will himself to action. In addition to this immediate crisis of willpower, he faces a simultaneous 
crisis of free choice. As he describes, “Something terrible had happened, but it fell to me to do 
something perhaps even more terrible. My thoughts spun round like a tornado, and I saw only the 
eyes of the dead old woman as she crawled toward me slowly on all fours.”80 In this moment, 
Kharms shows us an extreme example of what Druskin would call the “prison of free will,” or 
the constraining “situation of choice.” The old woman has entered his apartment and died, but 
now her corpse must be dealt with. To leave the corpse alone is a practical impossibility, but 
anything he might do to deal with the dead body seems just as awful, if not more awful, than the 
 




fact of her death itself. As it stands, the dead old woman exists in a sort of limbo state, in 
between the real and the surreal. Any action he might take to touch the body or recognize its 
existence to another person or authority would be an affirmation of her real existence, which is 
terrifying for the narrator. Even more to the point, he has to choose what to do. Whatever 
happens next will be his conscious choice, bringing consequences which will land squarely on 
his shoulders.  
Eventually, the narrator wrestles his thoughts into submission, at least enough to get back 
into his room and start packing the old woman into his suitcase. However, throughout the 
process, he is fully consumed by the project of maintaining willful control of himself. The 
narrator’s constant struggle with himself—ordering himself around and arguing with his own 
thoughts—reminds us that the boundary between rationality and insanity, sense and 
senselessness, normality and absurdity, are frayed to a near-breaking point. The abject absurdity 
and desperation of the narrator’s situation is overwhelming, and his mind has to work overtime 
to keep up the illusion of order and control. In more Druskinian terms, his will is straining to 
hold on, but he is nearing transcendence, nevertheless.  
The final stage of the narrator’s journey to faith is his literal journey to Lisy Nos, where 
he ultimately says the prayer that ends the story. In their analyses, both Carrick and 
Nakhimovsky describe the moment of the old woman’s disappearance as a burden being lifted. 
For Carrick, the disappearance of the old woman “liberates the narrator from the ‘sin’ for which, 
as a character in a surrogate Dostoevskian narrative, he needs to atone. The narrator does not 
require God’s intercession to relieve him of the Old Woman: She has already left him. Thus, 




warning or obvious need.”81 For Nakhimovsky, the old woman’s disappearance signifies the 
replacement of one burden with another: “The physical burden of the old woman has been lifted, 
leaving in its stead a spiritual burden, fear and guilt, that is all the more intense. Leaving the 
train, the narrator goes to the woods behind the station. His attention is captivated by a 
caterpillar; he gets down on his knees just as he did before the old woman.”82  
Reading the story through a Druskinian lens, a third interpretation arises: If, as I have 
argued above, the dilemma of what to do with the old woman represents the prison of free will, 
then her disappearance sets the narrator free. Since the old woman has miraculously disappeared, 
the narrator has been relieved of the necessity to choose. Druskin sees this as a crucial step 
towards the divine. As he makes clear in “You and I: Noumenal Relationship,” “The slavery of 
‘free choice’ can be overcome not through the denial of any particular [possible choice,] but 
through the denial of the very situation of choice.”83 Thus, the old woman’s disappearance can 
be seen as the weight and shackles of free will being lifted from the narrator’s shoulders, opening 
the doors to the divine for him to walk through. We can also see the final scene of the story 
through the lens of this quote from Duskin’s “On Faith:” “God is not in knowledge or certainty, 
but in ignorance and uncertainty. Kierkegaard: Paganism is belief in the believable. Christianity 
is belief in the unbelievable.”84 There is no tangible revelation of knowledge that leads the 
narrator to accept God. No miracle occurs in the traditional sense, and there is no life-affirming 
dialogue or monologue a-la Dostoevsky that would rationally explain why he goes into the 
woods and prays. Complete removal from the situation of choice has somehow, mystically, 
allowed the narrator to accept the uncertainty, even absurdity, of recent events. It is not that he 
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finds God and thus, prays. Rather, it is in the moment of prayer itself, which arises in a vague 
sort of mystery, that the narrator finally accesses God. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no single correct way to read Kharms’ “The Old Woman.” In fact, I think that to rely 
too heavily on any one interpretation is a mistake. “The Old Woman” is so fascinating precisely 
because it contains so much of Kharms—the comic, the ludic, the existential, the spiritual—all 
working with, against, and in parallel to each other. This chapter is far from a full unraveling of 
everything interesting this story has to offer. However, I hope to have shown here that by 
grounding Kharms’ story in the context of Druskin’s philosophy, new lines of interpretation 
arise. Through Druskin, we have cracked open two new aspects of “The Old Woman,” 
understanding the woman herself as an allegory for time and reading the broader plot of the story 
in conjunction with Druskin’s essay “You and I: Noumenal Relationship” to connect the 
narrator’s journey and his reckoning with faith. These interpretations allow us to go deeper into 
the metaphysical, existential side of the chinari absurd, bringing new richness and depth to the 
text. Elements of Druskin’s work can be applied in similar ways to the other chinari authors with 
equally fruitful results, and the following chapter will explore some of what Druskin has to teach 





Chapter 3: Equilibrium, Error, and Divinity in Vvedensky’s “God May 
be All Around” 
 
Introduction 
Alexander Vvedensky, born in St. Petersburg in 1904—just one year before Kharms and 
two after Druskin—stands alongside Kharms as the other best-known chinar. While Vvedensky 
remains, especially in the West, significantly lesser-known and less well-researched than 
Kharms,85 he was equally/no less central to the group’s work. Druskin seems to have had a 
particular affinity for Vvedensky: the two were childhood friends, having studied together as 
schoolboys along with another future chinar, Leonid Lipavsky. Druskin also wrote more as a 
critic about Vvedensky than Kharms, including a study of Vvedensky’s work completed in 1973 
called “The Star of Nonsense” (Zvezda bessmyslitsy), which stretches nearly 95 pages long.86  In 
addition to being the most widely known members of their circle, Vvedensky and Kharms had 
similar trajectories in life. Like Kharms, Vvedensky wrote a mix of prose, poetry, and drama, but 
was known in his lifetime as a children’s author, publishing primarily in the Soviet children’s 
journals Chizh and Yozh. Although Vvedensky parted ways physically with the other chinari, 
moving to Kharkiv in 1936, he maintained active correspondence with the others in St. 
Petersburg (then Leningrad) and continued to write both for children’s publications and for 
himself. Despite the physical distance between them at this point, Vvedensky and Kharms met 
their tragic fates only months apart. Arrested by Nazi forces in September 1941 for refusing to 
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evacuate Kharkiv, Vvedensky died that December on a prison train to Kazan.87  
 While the previous chapter explored one of Kharms’ most structurally “normal” works, 
this chapter will deal with Vvedensky at his most challenging, focusing on his generically 
confounding 1931 poem/play88 “God May be All Around” (Krugom vozmozhno Bog). This work 
follows a character who is first called “Ef,” through what appears to be his own execution. After 
his apparent death, Ef (now Fomin) finds himself in a series of strange conversations with 
various unexplained characters. Eventually, the piece takes a markedly eschatological turn, with 
a depiction of the end of the world: 
 Остроносов:  
Все останавливается.  
Все пылает. 
Фомин:  
Мир накаляется Богом, 
что нам делать.  
Ostronosov:  
Everything halts. 
Everything is burning. 
Fomin: 
God is heating up the world,  
what are we to do?89 
 
At the very end of the work, we are met with a fascinating and mysterious poem-within-a-poem 
in which Vvedensky reinforces the idea of the end of the world and turns the ambiguous title on 
its head, claiming not that God “may be all around,” but that only God is possible (Быть 
может только Бог).90  
 While many of Vvedensky’s works could be fruitfully analyzed through the lens of 
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Druskin, “God May be All Around” stood out as an appropriate piece to use for this chapter for a 
few reasons. First, the work’s content revolves clearly around religious-or at least spiritual 
themes: death, the afterlife, the end of the world, and the idea of God. Second, while Druskin 
never wrote extensively about this particular piece, its final lines contain the term that Druskin 
would later use as a title for his analysis of Vvedensky: the star of nonsense: «горит 
бессмыслицы звезда / она одна без дна» (The star of nonsense burns / it alone is bottomless).91 
Finally, the text is absurd on two levels: content and form. While some chinari works (like, for 
example, Kharms’ “Old Woman”) contain a relatively conventional structure in which absurd 
things occur, others are also absurd on the structural level: Sentences lack structural integrity, 
words frequently do not fit logically together, and grammatical conventions are routinely broken. 
Sentences are disjointed, and there is little in the way of logical narrative flow.92 Druskin himself 
identified this combination of structural and situational/content-based absurdity as specifically 
typical of Vvedensky’s work.93 All of these factors culminate in a text which can be productively 
connected with both Druskin the philosopher and Druskin the critic. 
In my analysis of “God May be All Around” I will engage not only with Druskin’s 
philosophy, but with his criticism, using the analytical studies he wrote in the last decade of his 
life to help unravel this challenging text. Beyond analyzing the thematic motifs of Vvedensky’s 
work, this chapter finds that far from being an obstacle in our search for existential significance 
in chinari texts, the semantic/structural absurd is a rich and important subject. By revisiting 
Druskin’s concept of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” (nekotoroe ravnovesie s 
nebol’shoi pogreshnost’iu) and understanding how he uses it in his analyses of Bach and 
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Vvedensky, I use the concept as a lens through which to find meaning in the midst of the text’s 
chaotic structure, positing that there is a spiritual, even transcendent quality to the structure 





As we saw in chapter one, throughout his life Druskin’s religiosity was closely tied with 
music—particularly with the music of Johann Sebastian Bach. According to his sister, Lidia, it 
was Bach’s “St. Matthew Passion” that affirmed his belief in God, affecting him so deeply that 
Lidia refers to it as a “second birth.”94 From Druskin’s diaries, which he kept from 1928 (shortly 
after this revelatory musical experience) until nearly the end of his life, it is clear that Bach 
continued to play a major role in Druskin’s thought. Druskin’s interest in Bach culminated in a 
book, O ritoricheskikh priemakh v muzyke I.S. Bakha (On Rhetorical Principles in the Music of 
J.S. Bach), which was published in Ukrainian in 1972 and then again in Russian in 1995. While 
this book did not find its way into print until late in Druskin’s life, his diaries show us that he 
was using Bach to draw structural and aesthetic comparisons between music and literature as 
early as the 1930s. Already in 1936, he wrote that “in research there must be a number of 
beginnings and endings, that is, there must be pauses and stops. The same is true in art, for 
example, in the allemandes of Bach.”95 As Marina Lupishko writes, Druskin’s musicological 
research in On Rhetorical Principles is remarkably detailed and granular. Druskin pulls apart 
Bach’s work, identifying motifs and figures—usually only a few notes long—which he then uses 
 
94 Lupishko, “In Search of Hieroglyphs,” 630. 




to analyze Bach’s music more broadly. He isolates a basic, fundamental component of music, 
analyzing it in great depth before stepping back to examine how it works with other figures in 
the overall structure of the work. Much like the diaries, Druskin’s book is conscious of the 
analogy between music and language. Druskin even mentions that his choice of motifs to study 
relied partially on the fact that “precisely due to the simplicity of their construction, [they are 
the] easiest to compare with the morphology of the word.”96  
The traits of Druskin’s long standing musical analysis—attention to detail, atomization,  
focus on structure and motifs—seem to have influenced the literary analyses of Kharms and 
Vvedensky which Druskin wrote in his later years. Chief among these works is “The Star of 
Nonsense” (Zvezda bessmyslitsy), written in 1973 and dedicated to the study of Vvedensky’s 
work, especially the cycle “A Certain Quantity of 
Conversations” (1936-1937). While it is beyond 
the scope of this project to discuss “The Star of 
Nonsense” in great depth, I want to stress its 
importance as the first real piece of Vvedensky 
scholarship. Important too is the analytical 
approach Druskin takes in the work, which 
resembles that of On Rhetorical Principles. 
Druskin insists that his goal is strictly structural, 
and strictly expositional. That is, he claims not to 
attempt to explain anything. Rather, he sets out to 
draw out, in his words, “the connections, alignments, parallels, oppositions, and implications” he 
 
96 Druskin, O ritoricheskikh priemakh v musike I.S. Bakha, 73. 
Figure 1: Diagram of Rug/Hydrangea (Kover gortenziya) 




finds in Vvedensky’s works. Like On Rhetorical Principles, this work is granular and structural. 
Druskin provides a  number of diagrams97 that lay out Vvedensky’s pieces in various visual 
forms. While Druskin may claim not to explain anything, he still goes to a great deal of effort to 
clarify the structure of Vvedensky’s gnarled works, untangling the mess of words to find some 
concept, word, or pattern that he can use to create something approaching structural clarity. 
Druskin reads literature musically, using the same analytical tools on both forms of art.98  
 In both On Rhetorical Principles and “The Star of Nonsense,” Druskin incorporates a 
term which is already familiar to us from the first chapter: “a certain equilibrium with a small 
error.” In these critical works, Druskin expands the concept’s application, seeing equilibrium and 
error as created through artistic structure:  
 [it is] precisely the shifting centers of equilibriums, that is, the asymmetry of 
Bach’s phrases, which create the ideal equilibrium … The perfect balance is 
maintained… There is an allegorical equilibrium in the structure of the whole—a certain 
equilibrium with a small error.99 
 
“Shifting centers of equilibrium” form the basis of equilibrium and error for Druskin in his 
analysis of Vvedensky as well. Describing the scheme of repeated motifs outlined in figure 1, 
Druskin notes that, “these brackets, their movement from left to right, and their exact and inexact 
repetition create the feeling of a certain equilibrium with a small error.”100 With this in mind, it 
becomes clear that the search for repetitions and musical motifs carries with it all the allegorical 
weight of “a certain equilibrium with a small error:” the search for selfhood, the separation of 
humanity from the divine, and “catalyst for all of human action and life.”101 To search and 
 
97 See figure 1. 
98 In addition to employing similar methods in literary and musicological analyses, Druskin reads literature 
“musically” in a more direct sense, describing the dynamics of Vvedensky’s text and metatext in the musical terms 
forte, piano, mezzo forte, and mezzo piano. (Druskin, “Zvezda bessmyslitsy,” 604). 
99 Druskin, O ritoricheskikh priemakh, 124-125. 
100 Druskin, “Zvezda bessmyslitsy,” 569. 




examine the text’s structural patterns is to undertake a task with markedly spiritual undertones. 
Druskin’s diaries show that he read “God May be All Around” in this manner. The entry 
for August 26, 1943, is as follows: “These days I enjoy reading Vvedenky’s poetry like I used to 
play Bach—unraveling hieroglyphs.” This is followed by a list of the “hieroglyphs in “God May 
Be All Around,” arranged chronologically:  
1. Ef and girl, motion. 
2. Conversation about life, time. 
3. Punishment of Ef—Fomin        
    Dead Man 
4. The Feast at Stirkobreev’s. Duel. 
5. Forest. Beggar 
6. Conversation of Hours 
7. Venus           
   Dead man (4 times).       
Fomin and Venus. Is there light?       
    Dead man. 
8. Fomin and woman.        
 Nosov, woman, and Fomin       
 Dormir, Nosov, dormir. 
9. Fomin and the People 
10. Fomin’s speech to the ancestors about transformation. 
11. Fomin and Ostronosov—transformation. The world is being heated up by God 
12. The corpse of the earth.        
    Dead Man102 
                                            
Druskin declines, as he often does in his diaries, to provide any analysis for this sketch. 
However, we do not need his analysis to see this outline as an invitation to create our own 
musical sketch of the poem, reading Vvedensky’s structural strangeness musically in search of 
elucidating themes and motifs. Using Druskin as an example, we can break down “God May Be 
Around” into five “acts,” complete with a prelude, intermission, and finale. 
 
 




• Prelude: The sacred flight of flowers 
o «Солнце светит в беспорядке, / и цветы летят на грядке...» (The sun 
shines in disorder / and the flowers fly to the garden bed)103 
• Act I: Ef and the girl, leading to the punishment of Ef and his transformation into 
Fomin  
o «Нету тебя Фомин, / умер ты, понимаешь? / Фомин: / нет я не 
понимаю. / Я жив.» (You don’t exist, Fomin, / you’re dead, don’t you 
understand? / Fomin: / No, I don’t understand. I am alive.)104 
• Act II: the feast at Stirkobreev’s, culminating in his duel with Fomin and the 
transformation of the hall into a forest 
o «Дуэль превращается в знаменитый лес. / Порхают призраки 
птичек. / У девушек затянулась переписка» (The duel transforms into a 
famous forest. / The ghosts of birds flutter about. / A long correspondence 
plays out among the women.)105 
• Interlude: The conversation of the hours 
o Including, among many other quips, «Пятый час говорит шестому: / мы 
опоздали» (The fifth hour says to the sixth: / we’re late.)106 
• Act III: Fomin’s series of conversations. Despite no described motion, Fomin 
undergoes a series of encounters with characters who challenge, embrace, and 
guide him. 
o Among a rotating host of unintroduced, mysterious characters, one called 
Nosov proclaims: «Фомина надо лечить. Он сумасшедший, как ты 
думаешь?» (Fomin must be cured. He’s insane, don’t you think?)107 
• Act IV: Fomin and the People, culminating in his speech  
o «Господа, господа, / глядите вся земля вода» (Gentlemen, gentlemen, / 
observe, the whole earth is water.)108 
• Act V: Fomin and Ostronosov, the transformation (burning) of the world, the 
arrival of God. 
o «мир накаляется Богом» (God is heating up the world) 109 
• Finale: The Star of Nonsense 
o «Горит бессмыслицы звезда, / она одна без дна. / Вбегает мертвый 
господин / и молча удаляет время.» (The star of nonsense burns, / it 
alone is bottomless. / In runs a dead man / and silently erases time.)110 
 
103 Vvedensky, “Krugom vozmozhno Bog,” 127.  
104 Vvedensky, 132. 
105 Vvedensky, 137. 
106 Vvedensky, 139. 
107 Vvedensky, 146. 
108 Vvedensky, 149. 
109 Vvedensky, 150. 





Looking at both our sketch and the one provided by Druskin, a few elements become 
clear. First, from our sketch, we see transformation (prevrashenie) arising as a thematic through 
line. In almost every act, something or someone undergoes a transformation. These 
transformations build up throughout the work, gaining momentum through their repetition and 
through their scale, beginning with an individual (Ef—Fomin), followed by a location (Hall—
forest), leading up to the finale, in which the whole world is transformed in fire, replaced by God 
and the Star of Nonsense. The spiritual implications of this theme are fairly straightforward. We 
already see an eschatological bent to “God May be All Around” in its final act, as Ostronosov 
and Fomin realize that “all is burning. God is heating up the world.” By the end of the poem, the 
apocalypse completes itself, ending in the death of the world, the deletion of time, and the 
existence only of divinity. While the end of the world does not appear as a strong theme in the 
preceding acts, the repetition of the theme of transformation (and, for that matter, death) gives 
the work a sense of continuity. The repeated transformations weave throughout the work, and 
while they do not bring the whole piece unity—transitions are still abrupt and destabilizing by 
traditional narrative standards—they tie everything together just enough so that it can still be 
considered a whole. Thus, transformation is a theme, but it is also a motif, the repetition of which 
strengthens the concept’s thematic impact in the absence of traditional plot structure or narrative 
development.  
  Another key repetitive motif which Druskin notes throughout the acts is the phrase “In 
runs a dead man.” Often, this line comes as an interruption of the poem, and is not logically 




(Вбегает мертвый господи / и молча удаляет время).111 As is often the case in chinari texts, 
it is difficult (and somewhat counter to the absurdist spirit) to look for an exact metaphorical 
significance to the character. Perhaps, in keeping with the eschatological theme, the dead men 
represent all the Dead of the world, raised up before the Last Judgement. Perhaps the paradoxical 
state of a dead man who can still take action is a reflection of Fomin, implying the existence of 
many such subjects, trapped in between the worlds of the living and the dead. Despite the 
inability to pin down his precise allegorical significance, we can view his reappearance 
throughout the story as meaningful in itself. Much like the dynamic we saw with the larger 
theme of transformation, the repetitions of “in runs a dead man” build up to its final iteration. 
When we see the dead man run in on the second-to-last line of the poem, finally ready to silently 
erase time, we are already conditioned to pay attention. Up until those final lines, the dead man 
remains ambiguous, and his mystery grows greater with each of his six unexplained appearances. 
This lends greater finality to the moment when he reveals to the reader his role in the poem by 
erasing time. One can even see the dead man’s destruction of time subtly reflected in his 
repeated appearances throughout the piece: He seems to poke holes in the narrative, further 
destabilizing the already-tenuous fabric of time. The dead man and his actions are given 
importance not through description, but through repetition.  
Thus, we have seen how thematic repetition builds momentum in “God May be All 
Around,” preparing the reader and leading them towards the finale, when the world has burned 
up, the star of nonsense shines, and “only God is possible.”112 However, there is still more to say 
about the creation and violation of structural equilibrium in “God May be All Around.” This 
same idea of applying “a certain equilibrium with a small error” to textual analysis also functions 
 
111 Vvedensky, 152. 




well on a more granular level.  
 
 
Rhyme and Meter 
 
Across individual lines and stanzas, structural integrity is constantly being created and 
broken in Vvedensky’s work. The poem has a definite meter and rhyme scheme, but no one 
pattern lasts more than a few lines. Vvedensky creates a structure and sets expectations for the 
reader, only to break them suddenly by changing some combination of meter, rhyme, line length, 
and other poetic elements. As an example, consider the poem’s first ten lines of dialogue, as Ef 
addresses the imaginary girl:113 
Здравствуй, девушка движенье, 
ты даёшь мне наслажденье 
своим баснословным полётом 
и размахом ног. 
Да, у ног твоих прекрасный размах, 
когда ты пышная сверкаешь и носишься над 
болотом, 
где шипит вода, — 
тебе не надо никаких дорог, 
тебе чужд человеческий страх. 
 
Hello lady motion, 
you bring me such pleasure 
with your fabulous flight 
and the size of your legs. 
Yes, your legs are of fantastic size, 
when you, luxurious, sparkle and run across 
the swamp, 
where the water hisses 
you need no roads, 
 




human fear is alien to you. 
 
Vvedensky begins with a neat couplet in trochaic tetrameter, which he immediately undermines 
in the next line. This third line can be read as anapestic tetrameter with a slight irregularity at the 
beginning, although this irregularity smooths out somewhat if we take the final –‘e syllable of 
the preceding line as the first syllable of the third line. In the middle section, the meter continues 
to vary, with alternating between trochees and iambs and various line lengths. The final two lines 
share the same first word, giving them a certain visual symmetry. However, as they do not rhyme 
and do not share the same number of syllables, they are far from a couplet. Looking at the rhyme 
scheme reveals a similar pattern: After the initial couplet, the rhyme scheme is highly irregular. 
Lines 3, 4, and 5 do not rhyme with each other, but they do rhyme with later lines— 3 with 7, 4 
with 9, and 5 with 10. Even here, Vvedensky refuses us the satisfaction of a pattern, leaving a 
four-line gap between line 3 and its rhyme while lines 4 and 5 are five lines away from their 
rhymes. Lines 6 and 8 remain rhymeless altogether. On the most granular level, then, Vvedensky 
repeatedly creates just enough of a system to make readers think they know what will come next, 
only to undermine that system in one way or another.  
 I find it helpful here to follow Druskin’s lead, creating a 
visual sketch of the repetitions. Once we do so, we reveal a 
clear similarity to figure 1 and render visible the certain 
equilibrium with a small error. As was the case in Druskin’s 
analysis, our analysis of rhyme scheme presents with enough 
repetition to create centers, but enough irregularity for those 
centers to shift dramatically. Moreover, this is just the rhyme 
scheme for one stanza. Other stanzas have different line lengths 
Figure 2: visualization of "God May be 




and different rhyme schemes, denying repetition once again. However, the same basic principle 
holds true throughout the piece: Vvedensky creates a certain equilibrium through recognizable 
poetic conventions which are then pulled apart and distorted. It is worth noting here the 
importance of a small error. Conventions are violated and stretched, but not completely beyond 
recognition. The “certain equilibrium with a small error” only works if the equilibrium remains 
visible through the error rather than being annihilated altogether.  
 
We have already seen some of the allegorical power of “a certain equilibrium with a 
small error” in Chapter 1, in our discussion of the essay “You and I, Noumenal Relationship.” In 
this case, Druskin the philosopher, writing a decade before On Rhetorical Principles and The 
Star of Nonsense, thinks of the equilibrium as the perfect image of God in which humankind is 
created while sin is the error, an error through which humans separate themselves from God and 
access the whole range of human experience. The small error connects two planes of existence 
which exist otherwise out of reach from one another. The equilibrium of divinity would be 
unreachable, except for a small error which humans can cling to. As Avdeenkov concludes, 
The small error reveals that element which makes the whole world of things real for us. 
The universe, the cosmos, and the earth present themselves as a certain equilibrium, 
stable and constant. The laws of nature are unchanging, and they function in all places at 
all times. However, the universe does not recognize itself, does not understand its 
realness and stability. To understand this one must venture beyond the bounds of stable 
equilibrium, introducing into it an element of error, inaccuracy. Humankind violates 
natural equilibrium through his existence.”114  
 
As argued in Chapter 1, this points us towards a broader allegory which the equilibrium 
of the Holy Spirit is violated by Jesus, who, in his humanity and mortality, represents a small 
error within that equilibrium. In all these cases, the small error seems to reach down from divine 
 




equilibrium to the imperfect world of human experience, allowing us to attain some measure of 
revelation and transcendence. We can go on to say that any time the term is invoked, a 
connection is formed all the way back to that ultimate allegorical significance of divine 
revelation. In fact, Druskin the critic bears this out in practice by connecting the philosophical 
term to his readings of artistic works. The structures, motifs, and repetitions in art—be it Bach or 
Vvedensky—are so important to Druskin not just because they help see through the noise of 
complex structures and identify themes. Rather, each creation and violation of structural forms or 
patterns— “a certain equilibrium with a small error”—becomes a reflection or miniature 
recreation of the larger equilibriums and errors of the universe. Even these small equilibriums 
and errors contain some transcendent, divine quality. 
 Thus, through Druskin, we see that the Absurd text itself, in both form and content, leads 
us to God. Our musical reading of “God May be All Around” reveals the prevalence of 
transformation—ultimately eschatological transformation—as a clear theme and helped us find 
allegorical significance of the “in ran a dead man” motif. Perhaps more importantly, we can now 
see spiritual weight in the text. In the very act of reading Vvedensky, we create something 
sacred, re-enacting divine revelation in miniature. It is worth a note here that Druskin saw 
reading as an active and relatively creative process. In his diaries, he compares reading 
Vvedensky to playing Bach, not just listening to it.115 In this context, the Star of Nonsense itself 
comes to fill a religious-allegorical role, becoming the guiding star of Bethlehem, leading the 
magi to Christ—the mortal, human God whose existence allows humankind to access the absurd 












 This discussion of “God May be All Around” brings to the fore new lines of analysis that 
hold interesting implications for other chinari texts and literature more broadly. On the surface, it 
would seem that Bach and Vvedensky are completely different from one another—indeed, that 
Bach is everything that Vvedensky is not. Where Vvedensky stands at the cutting edge of the 
avant-garde, Bach stands in the center of musical tradition,116 the foundation of the canon.117 If 
their works of art both contain the divinity of “a certain equilibrium with a small error,” what 
makes the absurdist style of the chinari important? Why did Druskin associate himself with the 
chinari and consider Vvedensky the greatest author of the 20th century, as opposed to someone 
whose style more closely aligns with Bach and the baroque tradition? While the true answer is 
impossible to pin down, the question leads to two interesting conclusions. First, in an effort to 
find something that makes the absurd text stand out, it helps to look at equilibrium and error in 
terms of levels: at the most granular level, we might have relationships that can play out over the 
course of just a few sentences or lines of text, like the poetic meter and rhyme scheme we 
explored earlier. At the very top, we would have the relationship described in Chapter 1, with the 
Holy Spirit as equilibrium and the mortal Christ as its small error. In between these two extremes 
lay all the equilibriums and errors we can imagine in art: all the plots and plot twists, patterns 
 
116 At conservatories like Oberlin, from where I am writing this, Bach’s music is still used as the foundation for 
introductory music theory courses.  
117 Of course, this was not always the case. During and immediately following his lifetime, Bach’s work was subject 
to plenty of controversy and criticism. For more on Bach’s reception, see Martin Geck, Bach, trans. Anthea Bell 
(London: Haus, 2003) and Russell Stinson, Bach’s Legacy: The Music as Heard by Later Masters (New York: 




and variations, artistic rules and their violations.  
Perhaps, then, we can think of the absurd text not just as something that contains 
equilibrium and error, but as the “small error” itself, within the larger rules—or “equilibrium”—
of rationalism, therefore existing on a higher level than other art. Perhaps, part of the absurd 
text’s significance is that its very existence cuts a gap in the plane of realism, allowing us to 
imagine something beyond it. Regardless of whether or not the chinari style is actually “higher” 
than other styles, Druskin’s ability to see the same pattern as a crucial function in both Bach and 
Vvedensky points to the potential for “a certain equilibrium with a small error” to be applied to 
other chinari texts and even to art in general. Perhaps we can take any piece of art and look for 
spiritual significance in its asymmetries, seeing the very artistic process—the act of creating and 






From everything covered in the previous three chapters, I hope to make two broad points 
particularly clear. First, that there is a vast metaphysical and spiritual richness to be explored 
beneath the surface of the chinari texts, and second, that the work of Yakov Druskin is an 
invaluable lens through which to examine this richness. By understanding some core components 
of Druskin’s thought, we gain access to the philosophical ideas simmering beneath the surface of 
the chinari. By using those ideas to analyze chinari texts, we bring them to the fore, giving way 
to new readings and showing old texts in a new light: Seeing a search for faith in the narrator’s 
disjointed wanderings in “The Old Woman,” and using “God May be All Around” in 
conjunction with Druskin’s concept of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” to uncover the 
sacred, transcendental quality of the text’s structure.  
From all of this, what can we now say in summation about the role of God in the chinari 
movement? Unsurprisingly, things remain somewhat mysterious. In a literary movement so 
defined by its rejection of absolutes and satisfying conclusions, to produce a single answer is 
beside the point. However, throughout the works analyzed here, we see a common existential 
thread. Through Druskin, we see the chinari wrestling with the impossibility of reaching a 
divinity which is already known to be far outside the bounds of knowledge, attempting to 
embrace the absurd conditions of life and find something sacred within and beyond them. In 
Druskin’s words, chinari metaphysics can be seen to revolve around “the desire to define one’s 
place in life … not empirically, but transcendentally.”118  
 Beyond its interpretations and analyses, this project raises questions and connections 
which demand further research. The idea of “a certain equilibrium with a small error” appears 
 




particularly fruitful as a concept and as an analytical tool, and I see potential for it to be further 
examined as a stand-alone philosophical concept or applied to other chinari texts. The parallels 
between Druskin’s thought and the concepts of European existentialists like Kierkegaard, 
Husserl, Sartre, Jaspers, and others is also fascinating. Further examination of these comparisons 
promises to be fruitful, and could help us connect Kharms, Vvedensky, and the other chinari 
with the European existentialist movement more than they have been in the past. Finally, this 
project has revealed to me the true scope of Druskin’s work. While I have made every effort in 
the course of my research to read and cover relevant concepts for my analyses of Kharms and 
Vvedensky, hundreds of pages and countless ideas remain unanalyzed. There remains a serious 
dearth of scholarship focused directly on Druskin, and even then, almost none of it is in English.  
A larger work on Druskin’s remarkable life and fascinating works, along with more English 
translations of his writings—would be of great value both on its own and as a component of our 
understanding of the chinari. 
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